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THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN BERLIN

By Herbert J. Stem.' New York. Universe
Books. 1984. Pp. 384. $15.95

JUDGMENT IN BERLIN.

Reviewed by Maynard E. Pirsig2
Judgment in Berlin is a fascinating and dramatic story about a criminal trial in the United States Court for Berlin, written by Herbert J.
Stern, a federal district court judge in New Jersey, who presided at
the trial. Not only is the story a human interest one about some
otherwise ordinary individuals who sought to escape from a communist country to the freedom of the West, it also reveals that governments may resort to arbitrary action and abuses when the rights and
liberties granted by the United States Constitution are absent.
The situation was a unique one. The trial was in the United States
Court for Berlin, an American court created specially for the American occupied zone of Berlin. Jurisdiction is confined to this zone and
does not extend to the zones of Berlin occupied by other Allied
forces. Judge Stern was appointed judge of the Berlin Court by the
United States State Department and served at the pleasure of the
Department. Until the present trial, the court had never been used.
It had no quarters and, to accomodate the trial, the old Templehof
airport was converted into a courtroom.
The story begins with two friends, Hans Tiede and Ingrid Ruske,
and Ingrid's twelve-year-old daughter, all residents of East Germany.
They were unhappy with the conditions under which they were living. Permission, required by the East German government, to leave
the country for West Germany had been repeatedly denied them. An
earlier escape attempt had failed.3 Their later effort succeeded, but
1. Judge, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Judge
Stem received his J.D. from the University of Chicago in 196 1. He was the United
States Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1971-1974.
2. Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. Professor
Pirsig is a former Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court and former Dean
of the University of Minnesota Law School.
3. Horst Fischer, a resident of West Germany temporarily in East Germany and
in love with Ingrid, obtained a false West German identity card for her. Her own
East German card permitted her to enter Poland when presented to the East German
border guard. She was to have presented her false card to the Polish guard on the
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not in the manner they had planned. The plan was to obtain false
West Germany identity cards which would permit the three to escape
by boat from Poland to West Germany. Horst Fischer, a resident of
West Germany who had fallen in love with Ingrid while temporarily
in East Germany, would bring the cards to Poland where they would
be used for the escape.
Tiede, Ingrid, and her daughter arrived in Poland and awaited the
arrival of Fischer, but Fischer failed to appear. When Fischer had
left West Germany for Poland with the false identity cards, he was
apprehended and returned to and imprisoned in East Germany. The
boat the three had intended to take sailed away. They dared not return to East Germany for the authorities there undoubtedly had
found the false identity cards on Fischer with Ingrid's picture and
they would immediately be arrested. They could not stay in Poland
where they had no work. In desperation, they decided to hijack a
plane from Gdansk, where they were stranded, and force the plane to
West Berlin, a one-hour flight. They obtained a toy gun, which
looked real, and boarded the plane without incident. With the gun,
Tiede entered the pilot's cabin and directed the Polish pilots to land
in the American zone of Berlin. On landing, Tiede, Ingrid, and her
daughter were immediately taken into custody by the American
authorities.
In 1978, preceding the incident, the United States and West Germany together with other countries signed international treaties
which required the respective countries to either prosecute or extradite hijackers landing in their territories. The treaties left some unanswered problems. Who should prosecute, under what law, and by
what procedures?
West Germany and the United States ...

had demanded these trea-

ties, which were aimed primarily at protecting their civil aviation
against terrorists seeking sanctuary in Communist or Third World
countries ....

[I]f the 'free world' expected adversaries to prose-

cute hijackers, would it not have to prosecute a hijacker who escaped from behind the Iron Curtain?
There would have to be a prosecution. But by whom? Everyone
wanted it, but no one wanted to be the one to prosecute. In the
meantime, the three were held incommunicado. (P. 28).
After months of delay and indecision, the United States State Department decided that the United States would prosecute the case to
save the West Germans "the embarrassment of having to prosecute
two fugitives whom their constitution gave the right to defect" (p.
other side of the border for permission to enter West Germany. Unexpectedly, the
two guards appeared together and she could present only her valid card. This left
Ingrid and her daughter stranded in Poland unable to enter West Germany. The
three then returned to East Germany.
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31). Tiede and Ingrid would be tried before an American judge in
the United States Court for Berlin pursuant to United States procedures. The crimes charged would be based on German substantive
law. In addition to the appointment of Judge Stern, the United
States State Department appointed two of its attorneys to prosecute
the cases. Mr. Roger Adelman, an experienced prosecutor, took the
leading part. Judge Stem designated Mr. Bernard Hellring of New
Jersey as attorney for Ingrid and Mr. Judah Best of Washington, D.C.
for Tiede. Both prosecution and defense attorneys were assisted by
American associates and by local German attorneys appointed to aid
in the interpretation of applicable substantive German law.
The case against Tiede appeared simple. The Polish pilots would
testify that Tiede forced them to land in the American zone of Berlin
under threat of using the gun. This would be confirmed by his own
statements to the American authorities as he emerged from the
plane.
The case against Ingrid was less clear. While she participated in
securing the toy gun, knew that Tiede intended to use it to hijack an
airplane to Berlin, and joined him in boarding the plane, she became
hesitant and fearful while on the plane and urged Tiede, without success, to drop the attempt. She took no part in Tiede's forcing the
pilots to land in the American zone.
The prosecuting authorities recognized the weakness of the case
against her. During her confinement of several months, they enlisted
the assistance of an experienced investigator, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Goeller, Jr., to obtain a confession from her. His plan was to
gain Ingrid's confidence and trust so that she would willingly give a
full account of the hijacking and the preparations that led to it. He
visited her frequently at her place of confinement, brought gifts,
showed affection for her daughter, and generally purported to be her
friend. For a time this brought no results, for Ingrid feared that information she might give would result in harm to her lover, Fischer,
awaiting trial in East Germany. Goeller learned of her reluctance
and assured her that Fischer was beyond help and could not be
harmed by the information she could give. He also assured her that
hijacking was "not such a bad thing because your intent at that time
was you thought that you were going to be arrested by the East
Germans" (p.38). With these assurances, she finally gave him a full
account of the hijacking and the preparations for it.
Colonel Goeller then obtained her signature to a statement which
released the United States government and its agents from all liability for her "voluntary" confinement. Thereafter, she and Tiede were
charged with criminal offenses under German law arising out of the
hijacking.
From the beginning, it was recognized by the judge and the prosePublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
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cuting and defense lawyers that the central issue was the extent to
which the Constitution of the United States applied. If it applied, the
defendants had a right to a jury trial. In addition, Ingrid's involuntary statements to Colonel Goeller might be excluded. Without
those statements there was no case against her.
To the surprise and dismay of Judge Stern, the prosecuting attorneys took what to him was an extreme position. According to the
prosecution, the Constitution did not apply, Berlin was an occupied
territory and it, its residents, and others there were governed solely
by the victorious occupier, the United States. This position meant
that the State Department determined what rights should be given
effect, whether there should be any court established at all, who
should be the judge, and how and what decisions the judge should
render. According to the United States State Department, the Constitution and laws of the United States simply did not apply. What
governed was what the State Department chose to recognize.
Not, the prosecution attorneys argued, that the Department had
any intention of going to the extreme of denying someone a fair trial.
But in this case, the Department preferred the trial to be to the judge
rather than to a jury and by implication at least, the admissibility of
Ingrid's confession need not be determined under principles applicable under the United States Constitution.4
Both Judge Stern and defense counsel were aware of the challenge
this posed. If the judge rejected the prosecution's position, the Department, under the views it expressed, could discharge Judge Stern
and replace him with one more willing to follow its views. It could
refuse to implement the appointment of a jury if it so chose. Or it
could dismiss the proceedings and send the defendants back to East
Germany.
Notwithstanding the judge's strongly asserted disagreement with
their views, and the vigorous arguments of defense counsel, the
prosecuting attorneys persisted in adhering to their views. Yet,
when faced with the prospect that thejudge would order the defendants freed from further proceedings, the prosecution reluctantly retreated from its position.
After a trial by jury was ordered by the judge, a Russian delegation
appeared. The delegation was concerned about the turn of events.
Were the American authorities really serious about the prosecution?
4. Conceding the good intentions of the prosecution, the judge commented on
the implications of the prosecution's position:
People could be dragged off the streets. They could be incarcerated.
Houses of worship could be closed, newspapers could be shut down, and
nobody could tell the Executive Branch of the United States Government to
stop. Certainly not the courts. . . . For if the Executive Branch is not willing to accept the confines of the Constitution in all things, it may throw it off
in all things. (P. 124).
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Would not a jury of West Germans be certain to decide for the defendants? To deal with the situation, the State Department sought
postponement of the trial, but the judge refused. The trial had already been too long delayed. The prosecuting attorneys then negotiated a deal with attorney Best that if Tiede would plead guilty, they
would direct passage of a Berlin ordinance assuring Tiede of early
release, regardless of what sentence the judge imposed. But Tiede
hesitated to accept this plea because he believed himself innocent.
With the applicability of the United States Constitution settled, the
court considered the admissibility of Ingrid's statements to Colonel
Goeller. The Colonel's testimony was the principal evidence relied
on by the prosecution. Under the skillful cross-examination of Mr.
Hellring, and the frequent questioning by the judge, who became
increasingly skeptical of the Colonel's testimony, the Colonel reluctantly admitted that Ingrid had indeed been held in involuntary detention rather than afforded "protective" custody from the East
Germans, as initially claimed, and that he had given her improper
assurances that led her into making the statements now sought to be
used against her. Judge Stern excluded the statements as improperly
induced and inadmissible under the United States Constitution. As a
result, the prosecution, with no other evidence to support a conviction, dismissed the charges against her.
What remained were the criminal charges against Tiede. His defense was based principally on a German statute making it a justification or excuse if a crime was committed under pressure. He
maintained that his imminent arrest in East Germany for attempting
to leave without permission, which is not a crime under West German law, came within the terms of the statute and justified the
hijacking.
Tiede was impressed with the fairness of the administration ofjustice in an American court because of the outcome in Ingrid's case.
He resolved to insist on a trial of the charges against him. He would
not plead guilty, whether it were a good bargain or not. He also
asked, with the concurrence of his attorney, Mr. Best, that Mr. Hellring represent him as additional counsel. Mr. Hellring and his associate, Mr. Shapiro, agreed to serve without compensation.
At the trial, the Polish pilots testified under the watchful eye of a
Polish prosecuting attorney who had accompanied them. The pilots
gave a harrowing account of how they were terrified by Tiede's behavior during the hijacking. But under cross-examination by Mr.
Hellring, a different picture emerged, consistent with what Tiede
had related to defense counsel. The pilots admitted Tiede told them
of his longing to see his children who lived in West Berlin and gave
them cigarettes which they smoked together-behavior hardly consistent with their earlier testimony.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
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The defense produced two escapees from East Germany as witnesses to show the pressure Tiede had been under in East Germany
and how difficult it was to secure permission to leave that country.
These witnesses recounted their escapes, and how others whose attempts had failed were imprisoned or otherwise punished or shot
attempting to escape over the Berlin wall. Ingrid testified in detail
about Tiede's and her efforts, first to obtain permission to leave and,
that failing, to escape. The defense concluded that Ingrid's testimony made it unnecessary to put Tiede on the stand.
The verdict was a surprise. The jury acquitted Tiede of three
counts, including the charge of hijacking, but found him guilty of
taking a hostage which carried a more severe penalty than the counts
of which they acquitted him. As Judge Stern notes, "The verdict was
obviously inconsistent. But juries are permitted to do that-to make
compromise verdicts" (p. 350).5
The imposition of sentence remained. The prosecution recommended the minimum sentence of four years imprisonment required
under German law. Taking into account his previous confinement
and parole provisions, Tiede would be eligible for parole within a
few months, a result identical with the attempted negotiated plea. A
German law professor, however, advised the judge that another section of the law permitted a minimum sentence of six months, a period already served while in confinement pending the trial.
At this point, another problem confronted the judge. Some residents adjacent to a park in the American zone of Berlin had sought
to bring suit to prevent the building of a housing project for the
American army on the park. The residents first sued the Berlin city
government in a German court for violating the necessary zoning
procedures. Because the question affected the American occupation
of Berlin, the suit could be entertained only with the consent of the
United States, which was refused. The residents then brought suit in
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, but that court
held that this was a matter for the German courts and dismissed the
case. Having learned of Judge Stern's ruling that the right to due
process under the United States Constitution prevailed in the American zone, the attorney for the residents filed a petition with Judge
Stern requesting an order that the residents' case be heard either in
the Berlin or German courts. The residents claimed denial of due
process, since they would otherwise be effectively excluded from access to any court.
The State Department was concerned about the Berlin residents'
5. The judge also noted that in arriving at its verdict, the jury was not told what
the sentences on the different counts could be "because jurors are never permitted to
know the penalties" (p. 351). May not this also account for the inconsistent verdict
the jury rendered?
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petition. Judge Stern received a letter from the American ambassador which stated with reference to the petition that "your appointment as a Judge of the United States Court for Berlin does not
extend to this matter" (p. 353). The attorney for the government
informed the judge that this meant that the judge must hold as directed by the government; the Berlin Court had no jurisdiction to
decide whether the petition was within the court's jurisdiction, and
that the judge's only alternative was to resign.
The judge received the letter while he was considering what sentence to impose on Tiede for the crime of which he had been convicted. Realizing that his status as judge of the Berlin court was
about to be ended because of the letter presented, he directed that
Tiede be brought before him for sentencing. The judge stated that
in view of the position taken by the State Department on the rights of
individuals in the American zone, he would not entrust Tiede to its
care or rely on its assurances. He then sentenced Tiede to imprisonment for the time already served in confinement and released him as
a free man.
The judge then turned to the residents' petition. The government
agreed that the ambassador's letter in effect directed the judge on
how he should decide. A contrary decision, according to the government attorneys, "would be a highly significant one and a very troublesome one to the United States, to its Allies, to the Berliners, and to
the Federal Republic of Germany" (p. 371). If the judge did not accept the direction, his only alternative was to resign. The outraged
judge did neither. "I know you can fire me here. That's your decision to make. .

.

. But I will not sit as a judge in this case and decide

anything in this case while such a letter is in this court" (p. 372).
With that, he adjourned court and left the bench-there would be no
decision under orders.
The next morning he received a letter from the ambassador terminating his appointment as judge of the United States Court for Berlin.6 The result? There was no court, German or American, to
which the petitioners could present their grievance.
A few observations about the book may be permitted. Thejudge's
6. Without a judge there could be no decision on the pending Berlin residents'
petition. They again took their case to the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, lost there, appealed to the court of appeals, and lost there. Dostal v. Haig,
652 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court of appeals held that military officials of the
United States, such as the defendants, were immune from suit in foreign local courts.
In addition, the petitioners presented no liberty or property interests required to
strike down official action under the due process clause. Id. at 177. With respect to
Judge Stem's position, the circuit court said, "We accept, arguendo his attractive position that the Bill of Rights is fully applicable to govern the conduct of U.S. judges and
officials in Berlin, respecting friendly foreign nationals," but distinguished the case
before it. Id. at 176.
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account discloses his deep commitment to the fundamental principle
that the independence of the judge is essential to the fair and impartial administration of justice. Because as a federal judge he had life
tenure, he could not be removed from his position in the United
States if the government objected to his conduct-his disposition of
the Tiede and Ingrid cases. He also believes that the rights of an
accused under the United States Constitution, such as the right to a
jury trial and the right not to incriminate one's self, should be rigorously recognized and enforced by the presiding judge in the trial of a
case.
One can hardly disagree with these basic principles. The reviewer
also accepts the judge's position that these principles were equally
applicable in the proceedings before him, in which he was acting as
an American judge, appointed under American authority. He presided in an American court, the United States Court for Berlin, and
the cases were presented principally by American lawyers, pursuant
to procedures followed in American courts. The position of the
State Department, as reflected in Judge Stem's account, that the Department as representative of the occupier is the determiner of the
rights of the citizens of Berlin, and that thejudges it appoints to preside there must decide as it directs, comports more with government
run by dictators rather than with democracies governed by rule of
law.
Judgment in Berlin also reflects Judge Stem's views on a judge's role
in a trial. A judge does not take a passive position, leaving it to the
lawyers trying the case to bring out the relevant facts and issues.
Speaking of jury trials, Judge Stem observed:
[T]hejudge does not sit to preside over travesties ofjustice. He is
not to watch silently while wrong overwhelms right, simply because
the wrong is better represented, or to sit passively when both sides
are so badly served that in the end no one-juror or judge-can
tell the right from the wrong. As long as he maintains a reasonable
regard for the role of the jurors as the final judges of the facts, he
may and, at times, he should ask questions to assist the fact-finding
process. (P. 181).
Judge Stem believes this is even more true when the judge sits without a jury and is the final arbiter of facts as well as law.
There are some, among them trial lawyers, who would not agree
with the principles espoused by Judge Stern. They would assert that
some judges are not as competent or able to maintain an objective
position in the trial of a case as assumed and exemplified by Judge
Stem. They would maintain that judges, in the course of their judicial duties, unavoidably are faced with questions of social, economic,
and political policy and that, in a democracy, they must in some manner be accountable for the policies pursued. That is the reason, they
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss3/9
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would say, why most states insist upon some public control through
periodic election of judges. How that accountability can be reconciled with the necessary objectivity and independence of the judge is
seldom explained.
An interesting facet of Tiede's trial was the use of the jury as the
trier of fact. Jury trials are unknown in Germany and in civil law
countries generally. Yet, here were twelve German jurors, unfamiliar with their role and responsibilities, who were asked to serve in a
criminal trial against a defendant, an East German, who had sought
refuge in their own country. The case was presented to them
through interpreters by an adversary procedure quite unlike German
procedures. One might well expect a bias in favor of Tiede and a
verdict exonerating him from any crime. Yet their verdict indicates
they sought to deal seriously with the issues of fact and law
presented to them. It is true that the verdict rendered was unexpected and that the jury probably did not fully comprehend the consequences to Tiede of their verdict. But trial lawyers will confirm
similar experiences with American juries.
One should note also the important role played by counsel. Judge
Stern's description of the proceedings indicates the dominant role
Mr. Hellring played in the defense of both Tiede and Ingrid. His
quick perception of the issues and how they related to his clients'
cases, his skillful cross-examination of witnesses such as Colonel
Goeller and the Polish pilots, and his persuasive arguments and oratory in the course of the proceedings played a major part in the outcome of the cases.
Finally, the story as related by Judge Stern is more than a dry account of a trial. He has a lucid style and imbues the participants in
the trial and the procedures followed with a realism that makes the
book a pleasure to read. Where needed, he gives the background of
the issues involved, a description of the personalities in the case, and
an explanation of the applicable constitutional principles.
Something of the man himself is revealed in his closing lines:
"Tiede left court as a free man. The man who set him free left Berlin
the same way" (p.3 7 5).
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In Recognition:
Dean Melvin B. Goldberg
This issue of the William Mitchell Law Review is dedicated
to Dean Mel Goldberg. Dean Goldberg has been a strong and
energetic supporter of the law review both as a dean and
throughout his tenure at William Mitchell. We make this dedication in thanks for his encouragement and support.
THE EDITORS OF THE
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

Mel Goldberg has served the William Mitchell College of
Law as a professor, associate dean, and most recently, acting
dean. In each of those capacities, Mel has made significant
contributions to the college. Mel has been an excellent colleague and teacher. During his first years of teaching, Mel and
I taught the same first year sections. He taught contracts and I
taught torts. The frequent discussions we had sharpened my
understanding of both areas of law. In his teaching, Mel has
been demanding both of his students and himself. I have always been impressed with the significant amount of time Mel
spent preparing his classes.
Mel has been a concerned, hard-working administrator. He
has been supportive of the students, staff, and faculty. He has
worked hard to provide opportunities for faculty growth. He
has been supportive of the needs of the faculty through working out teaching schedules, providing research assistance and
general encouragement, and he has fostered significant scholarly activity by the faculty. His support of the William Mitchell
Law Review has been an important factor in the continued
growth of the law review.
Now that Mel is leaving his capacity as acting dean, we will
be losing an excellent administrator, but regaining a full-time
colleague and professor. The college's loss in one area is a
gain in the other. Mel will continue to make significant contributions to the law and the legal profession.
MICHAEL

K. STEENSON

Professor of Law
William Mitchell College of Law
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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH

CIRCUIT.

Front row, left to right: Judge Donald R. Ross, Judge Gerald W.
Heaney, Chief Judge Donald P. Lay, Judge Myron R. Bright.
Second row, left to right: Judge George G. Fagg, Judge Richard S.
Arnold, Judge Theodore McMillian, Judge John R. Gibson, Judge
Pasco M. Bowman.
Not Pictured: SeniorJudge Floyd R. Gibson, SeniorJudgeJ. Smith
Henley.
Westrich Photography, St. Louis, Mo.
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